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Introduction
Imagine that you happen to find yourself engaged in a conversation about
women’s suffrage. To your great surprise, your interlocutor thinks that the
right of women to vote in elections is actually a bad idea. After a heated
discussion it turns out that, to your horror, he holds the firm belief that men
and women are not equal and should not have the same rights. What would
your reaction be? You probably are disgusted with his position, and surely
think that he is mistaken. Would that feeling change if you found out that
he also thinks that you are making a mistake? Would you think that both
positions are correct? Probably not. Most people think that in cases such as
the one above, there is only one true answer.
Let us, for now, use the term “objectivity” to denote this property of moral
judgements: that there is at most one correct position and that conflicting
judgments are mistaken. The most straightforward way to explain objectivity
is to hold that there is a moral reality. According to this explanation, moral
judgements are objectively true if and only if they correspond to moral reality.
This is an attractive explanation, because it is analogous to our explanation
of the objectivity of (some) non-moral judgements. The objective truth of
claims such as “the earth is spherical” and “the main cause of global warming
is human expansion of the greenhouse effect” is explained by environmental
and geographical facts.
So the initial idea is that just as geographical objectivity is explained by
geographical reality, moral objectivity is explained by moral reality. The meta-
physical commitments that come with such a proposal are, however, taken to
be deeply problematic. J.L. Mackie, for example, famously argues that moral
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entities or properties would be “of a very strange sort, utterly different from
anything else in the universe” (Mackie, 1977, p. 38). How could it be the case,
this line of reasoning goes, that the mere fact that an action has a particular
property gives us overriding reasons to act?1
To make matter worse, even if we set aside our metaphysical qualms and
allow moral entities and properties into our ontology, it is not obvious that
moral reality can explain moral objectivity. One additional problem is the
problem of semantic access. Many moral realists are so-called nonnaturalists.
They hold that moral entities or properties exist, but maintain that they are
causally inert and response-independent. Given this, the problem is how to
account for the connection between our moral words and moral properties:
how do our moral words manage to latch onto moral properties?2
The problem of semantic access has been neglected for a long time, but
is now starting to be taken seriously by metaethicists such as Matti Eklund
(2017), David Enoch (2011b) and Ralph Wedgwood (2007).3 The solution
that these philosophers propose is to adopt a specific theory in metasemantics:
conceptual role semantics (CRS). Metasemantics is the discipline which tells
us in virtue of what expressions get their meaning, and CRS is the position
that expressions get their meaning in virtue of the conceptual role that the
expressions play. In the different papers in this dissertation I will explain what
CRS exactly is, but for now I take this brief sketch to suffice.
So there are at least two problems for the realist explanation of moral
objectivty: a metaphysical problem and the problem of semantic access. In
this dissertation I want to investigate whether we can avoid these problems if
we don’t understand moral objectivity as correspondence with reality. I take
as a starting point the solution to the problem of semantic access that many
1 Mackie uses different terms to express his worry and it is an open question what the
best interpretation of this so-called ‘queerness argument’ is (see Olson).
2 For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Enoch (2011b, pp. 177-184).
3 That the problem has been neglected for a long time is surprising, especially given the
obvious similarity to Plato’s problem for accounting for the alleged fact that our words seem
to be about the Platonic Forms (Parmenides).
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realists have adopted: that is, the adoption of CRS. The dissertation consists
of six self-standing papers, which each discuss aspects of the different ways in
which the adoption of CRS changes the metaethical landscape. Each individual
paper makes a contribution to this project. One of the conclusions that I will
draw is that if we adopt CRS, we can give a different, antirealist explanation
for moral objectivity: we can have moral objectivity without moral reality.
0.1 Overview of the Chapters
Chapter 1
As stated above, the main question that I try to answer in this dissertation is
whether we can have moral objectivity without moral reality. This question,
however, presupposes a clear distinction between moral realism and moral an-
tirealism. The main problem regarding this distinction is what James Dreier
has called the problem of creeping minimalism. Many antirealists have adopted
minimalism about truth, representation and even existence. That is, they hold
that a sentence such as “lying is wrong” is true, that it represents lying as wrong
and that wrongness, ipso facto, exists. The problem of creeping minimalism is
that if antirealists make these realist-sounding claims, it becomes difficult to
see what exactly the difference is between realists and antirealists.
James Dreier is also responsible for the best-known solution to the creep-
ing minimalism problem. Unfortunately, however, this solution fails if we con-
sider some versions of CRS. More specifically, it wrongly identifies Wedgwood’s
moral realist inferentialism as a version of antirealism. I argue that this is a
structural problem. To remedy this problem I present what I take to be a
more promising explanation of the distinction between realism and antireal-
ism. I will argue that the correct distinction is made on the basis of what
explains the truth-value of a moral judgement.
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Chapter 2
There is a worrying argument that is brought forward against robust realists
who adopt a conceptual role semantics for moral terms. The problem is that,
arguably, metaethical realists can no longer explain how moral expressions can
refer to robust properties when they adopt CRS. The reason for this is that
reference to robust properties is typically determined through so-called wide
conceptual roles that require the referent to have causal powers. This is a
problem for nonnaturalists as they typically maintain that moral properties
are causally inert. However, it is also a problem for naturalists, as a variant
of the Moral Twin Earth Argument can be used to show that many recent
versions of naturalism conflict with intuitions on moral disagreement.
If the conclusion of this argument holds, then this would trivially show
that antirealists are not in a worse position to satisfy objectivity if CRS is
correct. For if CRS is incompatible with realism, then realism cannot satisfy
objectivity if CRS is the correct metasemantic theory. However, this conclusion
is mistaken. I show this by discussing one of the prominent versions of this
argument (Sinclair, 2017). I show that this argument fails. The reason for this
is that the argument implicitly assumes that all wide roles are causal roles.
I take this assumption to be mistaken. In this paper I propose a non-causal
wide conceptual role semantics for moral terms which is inspired by Michael
Huemer’s work on ethical intuitionism.
Chapter 3
Given the conclusion of chapter 2, one might think it is a good idea for propo-
nents of CRS to adopt the non-causal wide conceptual role semantics for moral
terms. However, this argument only shows that CRS is compatible with moral
realism. It does not solve the usual metaphysical and epistemic problems that
do not rely on the adoption of CRS.
To take away much of the force of these challenges to realism, David Enoch
has recently presented an indispensability argument which purports to show
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that we are justified in believing that there are robust normative entities. This
argument builds on indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics, but also differs in important ways from these arguments. In this paper I
argue that Enoch’s indispensability argument fails in its own terms.
Chapter 4
In the first half of the dissertation, I provide a detailed explanation of the dis-
tinction between moral realism and moral antirealism and argue that although
moral realism is compatible with CRS, it is not clear that we are justified in
believing that there are moral properties and entities. In the second half of
the dissertation I focus on versions of moral antirealism.
Antirealist CRS (also inferentialism) is often combined with a minimalist
attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many infer-
entialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to
refer to substantive properties. And it is easy to see how this combination
makes CRS attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Al-
though the attractions of combining antirealist CRS and minimalism are easy
to see, minimalism is also a controversial position. For one, minimalists main-
tain that truth is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what
an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as minimalists maintain that truth
does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that
truth should explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that minimalism
faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of antirealist CRS
would not depend on the minimalist’s ability to respond successfully to these
objections.
For this reason I will argue in this paper that someone who is attracted
to CRS because of its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions (in the
moral domain for example) is not committed to minimalism about truth. More
specifically, I show that CRS combined with a very plausible view on truth
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conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.
Chapter 5
In the previous paper I presented Inferentialist Truth Pluralism and showed
that it is a position that accords well with many antirealist motivations. The
relevant question that remains is whether it can help us in securing objectivity.
In this paper I assess that question.
I approach this question by first looking at Tim Scanlon and Derek Parfit,
two metaethicists who regard themselves as realists but who maintain that
realism in the moral domain does not have the metaphysical implications that
many find hard to accept in other realist views. I argue that Scanlon and Parfit
can plausibly be interpreted as truth pluralists.
Given this interpretation of their view, I investigate whether it can satisfy
objectivity. My conclusion is negative. I argue that Parfit’s and Scanlon’s
non-metaphysical moral realism fails to be more realistic than contemporary
versions of antirealism.
Chapter 6
So far, I have presented two versions of CRS, and have argued that they are
problematic for different reasons. The problem with realist inferentialism is
that it is not clear why we would consider ourselves justified in believing that
there are normative entities. Inferentialist Truth Pluralism does not have this
problem, as it is a version of moral antirealism, but it fails to satisfy objectivity
in the sense defined above.
In this final paper I present a version of antirealist CRS that has better
chances of satisfying objectivity. I argue that antirealists satisfy objectivity
for those moral judgements whose truth is entailed by the normative role that
our moral terms play. This requires a wider normative role than is usually
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supposed, but I argue that moral realists need this condition as well if they
want to secure objectivity.

